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A Rational Superego 
J. David Velleman 
Just when philosophers of science thought they had buried Freud 
for the last time, he has quietly reappeared in the writings of moral 
philosophers. Two analytic ethicists, Samuel Scheffler and John 
Deigh, have independently applied Freud's theory of the superego 
to the problem of moral motivation.' Scheffler and Deigh concur 
in thinking that although Freudian theory doesn't entirely solve 
the problem, it can nevertheless contribute to a solution. 
Freud claims that the governance exercised over us by morality 
is a form of governance that was once exercised by our parents 
and that was subsequently assumed by a portion of our own per- 
sonalities. This inner proxy for our parents was established, ac- 
cording to Freud, at the time when we were obliged to give up our 
oedipal attachment to them. Freud therefore declares that "Kant's 
Categorical Imperative is . . . the direct heir of the Oedipus com- 
plex. "2 
Scheffler and Deigh are skeptical of Freud's claim to have ex- 
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1Scheffler, Human Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 
chap. 5 ("Reason, Psychology and the Authority of Morality"); Deigh, The 
Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian Theory (Cam- 
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chap. 6 ("Freud, Naturalism, 
and Modern Moral Philosophy"). See also Scheffler's paper "Naturalism, 
Psychoanalysis, and Moral Motivation," in Psychoanalysis, Mind and Art: Per- 
spectives on Richard Wollheim, ed. Jim Hopkins and Anthony Savile (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1992), 86-109; and chap. 4 of Deigh's book ("Remarks on Some 
Difficulties in Freud's Theory of Moral Development"). 
2"The Economic Problem of Masochism," The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey et al. (Lon- 
don: The Hogarth Press), 19:156-70, at 167. Freud also identified the su- 
perego with the Kantian "moral law within us" (New Introductory Lectures, 
S.E. 22:61, 163 [77, 202]). (Page numbers in brackets refer to the Norton 
paperback versions of the S.E.) 
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plained the force of Kant's imperative. In Freud's thoroughly nat- 
uralistic account, our obedience to moral requirements owes noth- 
ing to their meriting obedience; it's due entirely to incentives that 
appeal to our inborn drives. Freud thus explains the influence of 
morality in a way that tends to debunk its rational authority, where- 
as the Categorical Imperative is supposed to carry all the authority 
of practical reason. 
But Scheffler and Deigh believe that moral requirements can 
carry rational authority, as Kant believed, while still emanating 
from a distinct portion of the personality, formed out of identifi- 
cations with other persons in the manner described by Freud. 
These philosophers consequently envision a rationalist version of 
Freudian theory. Scheffler describes this hybrid view as follows: 
[T]he suggestion that an authoritative aspect of the self may play a 
role in moral motivation is not obviously incompatible in itself with 
the rationalist position. Offhand, for example, there seems to be no 
reason why one could not take the view that the (generic) superego 
is part of the psychological apparatus whereby purely rational consid- 
erations succeed in motivating rational human agents. On this view, 
the superegos of rational human agents confer motivational authority 
on moral principles in recognition of their status as principles of pure 
practical reason.3 
Deigh also envisions a rationalist version of Freudian theory, but 
he would locate the force of reason in the ego, as "the force of 
the ego's initiative in negotiating peace among the id, superego, 
and the requirements of reality."4 Of course, the ego's initiative in 
these matters is also attributed by Freud to the operation of natural 
drives. But Deigh finds this aspect of Freudian theory unsupported: 
"Nothing in the theory beyond its own antirationalist commit- 
ments ... argues against a rationalist understanding" of the same 
phenomenon.5 Both philosophers thus think that Freud's concep- 
tion of the personality could and perhaps should make room for 
a seat of reason, though they differ as to where reason should sit. 
I think that this marriage of Freud and Kant is worth pursuing, 
for several reasons. Freud's theory of the superego provides a valu- 
able psychological model for various aspects of the Categorical Im- 
3Samuel Scheffler, Human Morality, 96-97 n. 22. 
4The Sources of Moral Agency, 130. 
5Ibid. 
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perative, if not for its rational force. And Freud provides something 
that is missing from Kantian moral theory-namely, a story of mor- 
al development. If only Freud's theory could be purged of its an- 
tirationalism (as Deigh calls it), the result might be a valuable com- 
plement to Kant. 
One feature of the Categorical Imperative that is reflected in 
Freudian theory is its dual status as a prescription and an ideal. 
On the one hand, the Imperative tells us what to do: "Act only on 
that maxim which you can simultaneously will to be a universal 
law." On the other hand, the imperative describes what a rational 
will does, and it thereby holds up the rational will as an ideal for 
us to emulate. In fact, the motive that induces us to obey the pre- 
scription is our reverence for the ideal that it conveys.6 These two 
aspects of the Categorical Imperative are mirrored in Freudian the- 
ory by the concepts of the superego and ego ideal. The superego 
tells us what to do; the ego ideal gives us a model to emulate. A 
standard reading of Freud posits a division of labor between these 
two figures, but I shall argue that Freudian theory makes best sense 
if they are seen as unified, in the same manner as the correspond- 
ing aspects of the Categorical Imperative.7 Our obedience to the 
demands of the superego must be seen as motivated by our ad- 
miration for it, in its alternate capacity as ego ideal. 
Freud's moral theory also reflects the interplay between internal 
and external authority in Kantian ethics. On the one hand, Kant 
says that the moral law is necessary and inescapable; on the other 
hand, he describes it as a law that we give to ourselves. We are 
bound by the authority of morality, according to Kant, and yet we 
somehow exercise that authority in our own right. This combina- 
tion, which sounds so paradoxical in the abstract, is made con- 
cretely imaginable by Freud. The external authority of morality is 
represented as the authority of another person, the parent; the 
autonomous exercise of that authority is represented as the as- 
sumption of the parent's role by a part of the self, in which the 
parent is internalized. Our ability to exercise moral authority over 
ourselves is thus explained by the familiar psychological process of 
internalizing other people. 
61 argue for this claim in "The Voice of Conscience," Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 99 (1998): 57-76. 
7See note 29, below. 
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One might think that personalizing the authority of morality in 
this fashion violates the spirit of Kantian ethics, which is often de- 
scribed as austerely impersonal. But here I disagree with the stan- 
dard interpretation of Kant. The Categorical Imperative is not an 
impersonal rule but an ideal of the person, and our reverence for 
it is therefore akin to our feelings for persons whom we idealize. 
That's why respect for the moral law, in Kant, coincides with re- 
spect for persons.8 Representing moral authority in the image of 
an idealized person is therefore compatible with Kantian ethics, as 
I interpret it. 
Finally, this representation of moral authority yields a story of 
moral development that should be welcome to followers of Kant. 
Kantian ethics is an ethics of respecting persons, others as well as 
ourselves. But what awakens us to the personhood of others, to the 
fact that the creatures around us are persons like ourselves? Freud 
gives the only plausible answer to this question. The main theme 
of Freud's moral theory is that we are inducted into morality by 
our childhood experience of loving and being loved-the experi- 
ence without which we would neither idealize nor internalize a 
parental figure. Love is our introduction to the fact that we are 
not alone in the world; and morality as formulated by Kant is our 
practical response to that fact.9 
Of course, the Freudian story of moral development can thus 
be assimilated into Kantian ethics only if it is significantly revised. 
The ideal that we internalize from those we love must not be mere- 
ly a representation of social respectability or conventional propri- 
ety; it must be an ideal of personhood as rational nature; otherwise, 
the result will not be an internal moral authority that Kant would 
recognize as "the moral law within." But I believe that Freudian 
theory needs to be revised in this direction anyway, and that the 
materials for such a revision are provided by Freud himself. My 
goal in this paper is to explain how this rationalist version of psy- 
choanalytic theory emerges from the works of Freud. 
Freud's Theory of Guilt: First Reading 
Freud often presents his moral psychology as a theory of the moral 
emotions, especially guilt. He claims to explain what guilt is and 
81 argue for this claim in "Love as a Moral Emotion," Ethics 109 (1999): 
338-74. 
9This way of putting my point was suggested by Christine Korsgaard. 
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how a sense of guilt is acquired. But Freud realizes that a theory 
of guilt must ultimately rest on a theory of moral authority, since 
a sense of having disobeyed that authority is prerequisite to feeling 
guilty. 
Freud introduces the connection between guilt and moral au- 
thority as follows: 
To begin with, if we ask how a person comes to have a sense of guilt, 
we arrive at an answer which cannot be disputed: a person feels guilty 
... when he has done something which he knows to be ['wrong']. But 
then we notice how little this answer tells us.'0 
What tells us little, according to Freud, is the answer that traces 
guilt to self-criticism framed in moral terms, such as 'wrong'. This 
answer is uninformative, Freud explains, because it "presuppose [s] 
that one had already recognized that what is [wrong] is reprehen- 
sible, is something that must not be carried out." "How," he asks, 
"is this judgment arrived at?"" 
What needs to be explained, in other words, is how some self- 
reproaches are recognized to be authoritative about what must or 
must not be done, so that they can occasion guilt. Saying that they 
are couched in moral terms simply raises the further question how 
these terms are known to bear the requisite authority. 
Freud prefers to think of moral authority as vested, not in a 
particular vocabulary of self-criticism, but rather in a particular self- 
critical faculty. This inner faculty is the superego, which is estab- 
lished at the resolution of the Oedipus complex, when the child 
imaginatively takes his parents into himself, through a process 
known as introjection. 
Freud hypothesizes that the introjected parent criticizes the sub- 
ject's behavior and, like a real parent, threatens to punish him for 
it. The subject's fear of this inner disciplinarian constitutes his 
sense of guilt. Thus, "the sense of guilt is at bottom nothing else 
but a topographical variety of anxiety; in its later phases it coincides 
1 Civilization and Its Discontents, S.E. 21:59-145, at 124 [71]. I have sub- 
stituted the term 'wrong' for the translation in the Standard Edition, which 
is 'bad'. Freud's word is bose, which differs from the English 'bad' in that 
it is essentially a term of moral criticism. If Freud had wanted a word that 
was morally neutral, like 'bad', he would have used schlecht. The difference 
is clearly marked by Der Grosse Duden, which defines bose as "sittlich 
schlecht"-"morally bad." 
1 1 Ibid. 
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completely with frar of the super-ego."12 Freud often refers to this 
fear as "conscience anxiety": Gewissensangst.13 
Here Freud equates the guilt induced by self-reproaches bearing 
moral authority with fear induced by reproaches bearing a threat. 
He thus appears to equate the authority of morality with the power 
to threaten. I do not believe that Freud's view can be reduced to 
this simple equation of right with might. But the best way to arrive 
at Freud's view, I think, is to consider various problems that would 
confront this simplistic version of it. 
One problem is how the super-ego can credibly threaten the ego. 
What does the ego have to be afraid of? 
What the child once feared from his parents is the loss of their 
love and of the protection that it afforded against their use of 
coercive force.14 What the ego fears from the superego is less clear. 
Freud says, "The super-ego retain [s] essential features of the intro- 
jected persons-their strength, their severity, their inclination to 
supervise and to punish."115 He says that the superego "observes 
the ego, gives it orders, judges it and threatens it with punish- 
ments. "16 Yet it is unclear what punishments the superego can ac- 
tually inflict upon the ego, and so it is also unclear what punish- 
ments it can credibly threaten. 
Although Freud refers repeatedly to the superego as aggressive, 
sadistic, and cruel, he never details its cruelties. At one point he 
says, "The super-ego torments the sinful ego with the same feeling 
of anxiety and is on the watch for opportunities of getting it pun- 
ished by the external world."117 Yet the feeling of anxiety men- 
tioned here is just the ego's fear of harsh treatment, and so it 
cannot constitute the very harsh treatment that is feared.18 And 
12 Civilization and Its Discontents, S.E. 21:135 [82]; see also 124-29 [71- 
75]. 
13Ibid., 124 [71]. For the term Gewissensangst, see the editor's note in 
Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, S.E. 20:77-175, at 128 [56]. Freud seems 
to equate the sense of guilt with Gewissensangst at "The Economic Problem 
of Masochism," S.E. 19:166-67. See also The Ego and the Id, S.E. 19:57 [60]; 
New Introductory Lectures S.E. 22:62 [77]. 
14 Civilization and Its Discontents, S.E. 21:124 [71]; New Introductory Lectures, 
S.E. 22:62 [77]; An Outline of Psychoanalysis, S.E. 23:141-207, at 206 [95]. 
15"The Economic Problem of Masochism," S.E. 19:167. 
16Outline of Psychoanalysis S.E. 23:205 [95]. See also New Introductory Lec- 
tures, S.E. 22:62 [77]: "the super-ego ... observes, directs, and threatens 
the ego." 
17 Civilization and Its Discontents, S.E. 2 1:125 [72]. 
18For a similar problem, see New Introductory Lectures, S.E. 22:78 [97], 
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Freud never explains how the ego might foresee and hence fear 
the superego's ability to enlist the external world in administering 
punishments, since these machinations take place outside of the 
subject's consciousness.19 
A possible solution to the problem is contained in Richard Wol- 
lheim's account of introjection.20 In Wollheim's account, the inter- 
nalized parent is a figure of fantasy, whose aggression the child 
imagines both undergoing and watching himself undergo. Wol- 
lheim likens the fear of conscience to the fear felt by an audience 
when it empathizes with a character being victimized on the stage. 
The only difference is that victimization of the ego is enacted in 
where the superego is said to punish the ego with "tense feelings of infe- 
riority and of guilt." How can the ego be punished with feelings of guilt, 
if feelings of guilt consist in the fear of this very punishment? (As for the 
feelings of inferiority, see the text at note 33, below.) 
O90ne possible solution to the problem is suggested in this passage: 
"[W]e can tell what is hidden behind the ego's dread of the super-ego. 
The superior being, which turned into the ego ideal, once threatened 
castration, and this dread of castration is probably the nucleus around 
which the subsequent fear of conscience has gathered; it is this dread that 
persists as the fear of conscience" (The Ego and the Id, S.E. 19:57 [60]). 
Here the fear of conscience is described as a remnant of an earlier fear, 
felt by the child (a boy, of course) who perceived his father as threatening 
castration. If Gewissensangst i  castration anxiety redirected at the superego, 
then it is actually misdirected and cannot be explained by any real danger. 
The superego could nevertheless torment the ego by exacerbating its mis- 
directed fear, like a mugger brandishing a toy knife. Elsewhere, however, 
Freud admits that tracing Gewissensangst to castration anxiety only deepens 
the mystery (Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, S.E. 20:139 [69]): "Castration 
anxiety develops into moral anxiety-social anxiety-and it is not so easy 
now to know what the anxiety is about." Freud therefore returns to his 
more general account of conscience anxiety: " [W] hat the ego regards as 
the danger and responds to with an anxiety-signal is that the super-ego 
should be angry with it or punish it or cease to love it." But why should 
the ego fear inciting the superego's anger or losing its love? In Civilization 
and Its Discontents, S.E. 21:124 [71], Freud says that the loss of love is feared 
because it opens the way to punishment; and surely the same should be 
said about the incitement of anger. So the explanation once again depends 
on the superego's power to punish the ego, which remains mysterious. In 
the Outline (S.E. 23:200 [87-88]), Freud says that the children fear "loss of 
love which would deliver them over helpless to the dangers of the external 
world," but this remark is once again inapplicable to the loss of love from 
the superego. 
20The Thread of Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 121- 
29. Wollheim attributes this account to the work of Karl Abraham and 
Melanie Klein. 
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the mind, with the subject imagining himself in the roles of victim 
and audience simultaneously. In his imagined capacity as empa- 
thetic audience to this scene, the subject experiences real fear. 
Even if we concede the superego's ability to instill fear in the 
ego, a more serious problem remains, in that fear differs from guilt 
and cannot come to resemble it just by being internalized.21 The 
merely "topographical" characteristics of fear-its being located in 
the ego and directed at the superego-seem insufficient o trans- 
form it into the emotion of guilt.22 
There is no reason to think that an emotion originally felt by a 
person interacting with other people would give rise to an entirely 
new emotion just by being consigned to one part of his psyche 
interacting with other parts.23 Consider a child who is continually 
teased as ugly or stupid and who internalizes that teasing. We can 
expect that he will be unduly afraid of attracting attention, and 
that when he does attract it he will feel unwarranted embarrass- 
ment. That is, we can expect him to re-experience, in the face of 
his internal tormentors, the same emotions that he experienced 
in the face of their external models. To be sure, internalization 
will have altered the relevant interactions in some respects. For 
example, internal ridicule will greet his mere thought of saying 
something in public, before he ever opens his mouth.24 Although 
21This point is the main thesis of David H. Jones, "Freud's Theory of 
Moral Conscience," Philosophy 41 (1966): 34-57. See also Scheffler, Human 
Morality, 87-88; Herbert Morris, "The Decline of Guilt," in Ethics and Per- 
sonality: Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. John Deigh (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 117-31, at 121-22. 
22Commentators on Freud tend to use the term 'topographical' to dis- 
tinguish Freud's earlier model of unconscious, preconscious, and con- 
scious minds from his later, "structural" model of id, ego, and superego. 
In their terminology, the location of fear with respect to ego and superego 
would be a matter of structure, not topography. But Freud himself used 
the term 'topographical' for the latter model as well as the former. See, 
for example, "Psycho-Analysis," S.E. 20:261-70, at 266. 
23Here I am disagreeing with John Deigh, who argues that the occur- 
rence of anxiety in the ego may well amount to the occurrence of some 
other emotion, such as guilt, in the person ("Remarks on Some Difficulties 
in Freud's Theory of Moral Development," 90ff.). In principle, Deigh is 
right to reject "the assumption ... that for the purpose of ascribing emo- 
tions to someone that person and his ego are identical" (91). But I see no 
reason why the difference between a person and his ego should make the 
difference between guilt and anxiety. 
24This point corresponds, of course, to Freud's point about the super- 
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he never raises his hand in class, his teachers will be able to tell 
when he knows the answer, because he has blushed. But internal- 
ization won't alter the emotions themselves: internal teasing will 
arouse embarrassment just like real teasing. 
Similarly, if a real threat inspires ordinary fear, then so should 
an intra-psychic threat. Why, then, does the ego's fear of the su- 
perego amount to the subject's feeling guilty rather than merely 
afraid? 
This problem reflects back on the superego's authority, which 
was supposed to consist in the power to issue credible threats. Cor- 
responding to the fact that this power might arouse only brute fear 
rather than guilt is the fact that it might constitute only brute mus- 
cle rather than authority. The power to threaten is the power of a 
bully. 
Another way to pose this problem is to ask how the aggression 
of the parents or the superego comes to be conceived as punish- 
ment rather than some other form of coercion. Part of the answer 
ought to be that the parents' aggression is conceived as punish- 
ment because it is seen to be backed by authority. Yet what has 
been posited in back of this aggression, thus far, is merely the 
power to threaten it, which doesn't adequately differentiate it from 
any other form of aggression. The question therefore remains why 
the parents, and their internal surrogate, come to be conceived as 
authorities administering punishment rather than as arm-twisting 
bullies. 
I doubt whether Freud thought that the authority of parents or 
the superego could be reduced to their power to issue credible 
threats. For that very reason, however, I doubt whether he thought 
that the superego inspired guilt simply by inspiring fear. I rather 
think that he sought to explain guilt as a particular species of fear, 
differentiated from other species by its intentional object. 
Freud's Explanation of Guilt: Second Reading 
The idea behind this explanation is that fear of being punished by 
an authority is a different emotion from fear of being coerced by 
a bully, because it has a different conceptual content. By "fear of 
ego's punishing wishes as well as deeds (Civilization and Its Discontents, S.E. 
21:125, 127 [72, 74]). 
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the superego" Freud means, not fear of a figure that happens to 
be the superego, but fear of the superego so conceived-con- 
ceived, that is, as playing the superego's role, of an authority ad- 
ministering punishment. This "topographical variety of anxiety" 
differs from other varieties by being about a particular part of the 
psychic topography, functionally specified-namely, the part with 
the authority to punish.25 Anxiety about this authority has moral 
content and therefore qualifies as intrinsically moral anxiety, which 
is equivalent to guilt. 
This interpretation diminishes the explanatory importance of 
the subject's introjecting the object of his fear. Guilt does not arise, 
on this interpretation, whenever fear is redirected from outer to 
inner aggressors. Rather, guilt arises when the object of fear is con- 
ceived as a punishing authority. Hence the introjection of the par- 
ents to form the superego is not the crucial step in the develop- 
ment of guilt. The superego can inspire guilt only because it is 
formed out of figures already conceived as authorities administer- 
ing punishment; and external authorities so conceived would al- 
ready be capable of inspiring moral anxiety, and hence of inspiring 
guilt.26 
The crucial step in the development of guilt, according to this 
interpretation, is the recognition of aggressors as authorities, and 
of their aggression as punishment. So interpreted, however, Freud 
appears to have largely postponed his question rather than an- 
swered it. 
The question was how some self-reproaches are recognized to 
have that authority which inspires guilt. The answer initially attri- 
buted to Freud was that they are recognized to have this authority 
when they are perceived to be backed by a credible threat. That 
25Freud himself says that his "topographical" method is in fact a way 
of expressing the interrelations of "agencies or systems" (An Autobiographical 
Study, S.E. 20:3-74, at 32 [34-35]). See also note 22, above. 
Note that Freud vacillates on precisely this point in Civilization and Its 
Discontents. In part 7 (S.E. 21:125 [71]) he suggests that the child's fear of 
external authority should not be described as a sense of guilt, because the 
phrase properly applies only to fear felt in the face of internal authority, 
or conscience. But in part 8 (S.E. 21:136 [83]), he says that the sense of 
guilt "is in existence before the super-ego, and therefore before con- 
science, too. At that time it is the immediate expression of fear of the 
external authority." Deigh resolves this inconsistency in the opposite di- 
rection. I discuss it further in note 35, below. 
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answer was inadequate because it could explain only the produc- 
tion of generic anxiety rather than guilt, which is specifically moral 
anxiety. The initial answer has therefore been superseded by the 
claim that self-reproaches inspire moral anxiety when they are rec- 
ognized as the reproaches of an authority administering punish- 
ment; which is just to say that they are recognized to have the 
requisite authority when they are seen to issue from a figure of 
authority; which is not to say very much. 
But it is to say more than nothing. The answer now attributed 
to Freud gives some characterization of the authority that a self- 
reproach must be seen to have if it is to occasion guilt: the requisite 
kind of authority is the authority to punish. Even if Freud's answer 
to our question ended here, it would not be entirely trivial. In fact, 
however, I think that Freud's answer continues, with an explana- 
tion of how the authority to punish is recognized. I therefore turn 
to this further explanation. 
The Source of Moral Authority 
In many passages, Freud describes the sense of guilt as something 
more complex than fear of the superego. He describes it as "the 
expression of the tension between the ego and the super-ego,"27 
making clear that this tension reproduces a multiply ambivalent 
relation between child and parent. 
As we have seen, the child fears his parents in their capacity as 
disciplinarians, and he introjects them to form an agency of self- 
discipline. But the child also loves and admires his parents, and he 
similarly gives himself an inner object of love and admiration, the 
ego ideal. Although Freud undergoes various changes of mind on 
this subject,28 he generally describes the feared disciplinarian and 
27New Introductory Lectures, S.E. 22:61 [76]. See also "The Economic 
Problem of Masochism," S.E. 19:166-67; The Ego and the Id, S.E. 19:37, 51 
[33, 51]; Civilization and Its Discontents, S.E. 21:136 [83]. 
28As I shall explain below, Freud first hypothesized that the ego gave 
itself an ideal to receive the narcissistic love that it could no longer invest 
in itself, in light of parental criticism; but he later traced the ego ideal to 
the parents, on the hypothesis that the superego contained precipitates of 
them not only as objects of fear but also as objects of admiration. The 
vagaries of Freud's views on this subject are summarized in Joseph Sandler, 
Alex Holder, and Dale Meers, "The Ego Ideal and the Ideal Self," The 
Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 18 (1963): 139-58. See also Joseph Sandler, 
"On the Concept of the Superego," The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 15 
(1960): 128-62. 
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the admired ideal as coordinate functions of a single internal fig- 
ure.29 The disciplinarian criticizes and threatens to punish the ego 
for not living up to the example set by the ideal. The introjected 
parent, in which these functions are combined, is therefore the 
internal object of mixed feelings, which combine fear and admi- 
ration.30 
29An alternative interpretation holds that these two functions are in- 
dependent: the disciplinary function enforces norms of conduct and in- 
flicts feelings of guilt, drawing on the instinct of aggression; the ideal func- 
tion holds out norms of personal excellence and inflicts feelings of infe- 
riority, drawing on the erotic instincts. (See Deigh, "Freud, Naturalism, 
and Modern Moral Philosophy," in The Sources of Moral Agency, 111-32, at 
126-28. See also Wollheim, The Thread of Life, 218-25; and Jeanne Lampl- 
de Groot, "Ego Ideal and Superego," The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 
17 (1962): 94-106.) At best, I think, this interpretation reconstructs a view 
toward which Freud might have been gravitating in his later works: it is 
certainly not a view at which he ever arrived. There is no question but that 
the superego first entered Freud's thought as the critical faculty that com- 
pares the ego with its ideal (in "On Narcissism"). Here disciplinarian and 
ideal work together, the former taking the ego to task for violating the 
norms embodied in the latter. This alliance continues in subsequent works, 
such as The Ego and the Id, where the terms 'super-ego' and 'ego ideal' are 
used interchangeably. The alternative interpretation relies on the New In- 
troductory Lectures, where Freud distinguishes a sense of inferiority from a 
sense of guilt, saying that " [i] t would perhaps be right to regard the former 
as the erotic complement to the moral sense of inferiority" (S.E. 22:66 
[82]). Note that even here, Freud fails to draw a sharp distinction between 
inferiority and guilt, since he refers to the latter as "the moral sense of 
inferiority," to be distinguished from an erotic sense of inferiority that is 
found in the "inferiority complex" of neurotics. (See also The Ego and the 
Id, S.E. 19:51 [51-52].) Hence no general distinction between inferiority 
and guilt is intended. Nor is there any textual evidence, to my knowledge, 
for a division of labor between ego ideal and superego in producing these 
feelings. Freud goes on in the same passage, for example, to say that the 
superego "punishes [the ego] with tense feelings of inferiority and of 
guilt" (S.E. 22:78 [97]). (I discuss this statement in note 18, above, and in 
the text, below. See also Group Psychology, S.E. 18:131 [81].) The notion of 
an alliance between the disciplinary and ideal functions of the superego is 
supported not only by the weight of textual evidence but also by the phil- 
osophical considerations that I shall adduce. The alliance helps Freud to 
account for the moral content that differentiates guilt from other forms 
of anxiety. 
30See, for example, The Ego and the Id, S.E. 19:36 [32]: "When we were 
little children we knew these higher natures, we admired them and feared 
them; and later we took them into ourselves." In Totem and Taboo, Freud 
asserts that conscience "arose, on a basis of emotional ambivalence, from 
quite specific human relations to which this ambivalence was attached" 
(S.E. 13:68). Freud's account of conscience in this work is rather different 
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The ego ideal provides the normative background against which 
the superego can be conceived as having authority. The superego's 
aggression is seen as premised on a normative judgment, to the 
effect that the ego has fallen short of the ideal. This judgment is 
what justifies the superego's aggression, insofar as it is justified. The 
question of moral authority thus comes down to the question why 
the ego recognizes this normative judgment as justifying aggression 
against itself. 
Part of the answer is that the norm applied in this judgment is 
the ego's own ideal, "by which the ego measures itself, which it 
emulates, and whose demand for ever greater perfection it strives 
to fulfil.""3 The ego thinks that it is being criticized and punished 
from the theory that he subsequently developed, beginning with the paper 
"On Narcissism," which appeared in the following year. Nevertheless, Totem 
and Taboo contains several references to the form of ambivalence that I am 
currently discussing-namely, the combination of admiration and fear. See, 
for example, p. 50 ("distrust of the father is intimately linked with admi- 
ration for him") and p. 130 (Little Hans "admired his father as possessing 
a big penis and feared him as threatening his own"). This particular com- 
bination of emotions is only one of many cited in this work as accounting 
for taboo, "the earliest form in which the phenomenon of conscience is 
met with" (S.E. 13:67]). In a later work, however, it is singled out as car- 
rying the entire explanation. Here (Group Psychology, S.E. 18:135 [86-87]) 
Freud says that the father of the primal horde was "at once feared and 
honoured, a fact which led later to the idea of taboo." My interpretation 
of Freud preserves the connection between conscience and taboo, as ob- 
jects of admiration and fear combined. 
31New Introductory Lectures, S.E. 22:64-65 [81]. The idea that the ego's 
admiration for the ideal constitutes its acceptance of norms is supported 
by the following passage, with which the concept of the ideal is first intro- 
duced: "We have learnt that libidinal instinctual impulses undergo the 
vicissitude of pathogenic repression if they come into conflict with the 
subject's cultural and ethical ideas. By this we never mean that the individ- 
ual in question has a merely intellectual knowledge of the existence of 
such ideas; we always mean that he recognizes them as a standard for 
himself and submits to the claims they make on him. Repression, we have 
said, proceeds from the ego; we might say with greater precision that it 
proceeds from the self-respect of the ego" ("On Narcissism," S.E. 14:93). 
Freud then introduces the ego ideal as the vehicle of the ego's self-respect. 
He thereby suggests that the ego ideal represents the subject's acceptance 
of ethical norms "as a standard for himself." See also this passage from 
the Outline, S.E. 23:206:" [I]f the ego has successfully resisted a temptation 
to do something which would be objectionable to the super-ego, it feels 
raised in its self-esteem and strengthened in its pride, as though it had 
made some precious acquisition." 
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for a failure to meet its own standards, the standards that it ac- 
cepted as applicable to itself when it adopted an ideal. 
Yet the ego's having accepted these standards as applicable to 
itself doesn't necessarily entail having acknowledged a particular 
figure as authorized to enforce them. Where does the superego 
get the authority to demand that the ego fulfil its own standards, 
and to punish it when it fails? 
The authority for the demand comes, I think, from the super- 
ego's being an aspect of one and the same figure as the ideal. This 
figure, in its capacity as ego ideal, sets an example for the ego; in 
its capacity as superego, it demands that the ego live up to the 
example. The demands that it makes in the latter capacity merely 
articulate the requirements that it mutely establishes in the former. 
The superego's authority to make demands on the ego was thus 
granted by the ego itself, as part and parcel of the ideal's authority 
to set requirements. The one authority is just the verbal correlative 
of the other.32 
But what about the authority to punish? What gives the superego 
the authority to make the ego suffer for falling short of its own 
ideal? 
At one point Freud describes the superego as punishing the ego 
with "feelings of inferiority."33 This lash was placed in the super- 
ego's hands by the ego as well. Insofar as the ego can be punished 
with feelings of inferiority, it exposed itself to this punishment by 
idealizing the figure to which it can now be made to feel inferior. 
Unfortunately, this subtle, psychological form of suffering is not 
one with which the ego can feel threatened when criticized by the 
superego. For as soon as the ego has been criticized, it already 
experiences this suffering and is no longer in a position to fear it. 
And if there is nothing further for the ego to fear, beyond the 
sense of inferiority that it already feels under the superego's criti- 
cism, then it will not feel any anxiety, without which there can be 
no sense of guilt. In order for the superego's reproaches to inspire 
moral anxiety in the ego, they must threaten something other than 
the feelings of inferiority that they have already inflicted. 
32Also relevant here is Freud's suggestion that idealizing a person entails 
deferring to his judgment. See the passage from "Three Essays" quoted in 
note 42, below. 
33New Introductory Lectures, S.E. 22:78 [97], discussed in note 29, above. 
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But the child will have been punished by his actual parents, and 
unless he has been abused, their punishment will have inflicted 
more insult than injury. He will therefore have come to associate 
parental criticism with punishment, as if punishment were another 
form of criticism, expressed in actions rather than words. When 
the child's ego hears criticism from the introjected parent, it will 
expect punishment to follow, but it is unlikely to distinguish be- 
tween them with respect to their legitimacy. It will regard the an- 
ticipated punishment as the practical aspect of criticism, which it 
has authorized the superego to make, as the voice of the ego ideal. 
These psychic materials strike me as sufficient to constitute a 
rudimentary conception of the superego's authority to punish. It 
is not, in my view, an adequate conception of such authority, but 
it comes as close as Freudian theory can come, pending revision. 
I shall therefore return to this topic briefly at the end of the paper, 
after I have proposed a philosophical revision to the theory. 
The Importance of Idealization 
If this reading of Freud is correct, then his explanation for the 
sense of guilt depends crucially on admiration as well as fear of 
the parents or their internal representative. The ego's idealization 
of these figures is what cloaks their aggression in the authority that 
inspires moral anxiety rather than brute fear. Because the ego has 
set these figures on a pedestal, it now fears their aggression from 
above-as aggression before which it bows as well as cowers-and 
this concessive form of anxiety constitutes the emotion of guilt. 
Under this interpretation, however, a child internalizes his par- 
ents' discipline in two distinct senses.34 On the one hand, he in- 
trojects his parents to form an inner agency of criticism and ag- 
gression. On the other hand, his admiration for these figures, both 
real and introjected, entails that his ego accepts and applies to itself 
the values that they express. So the child not only takes in the 
demanding figures of his parents but also buys in to their de- 
mands.35 
340n the different modes of internalization, see Roy Schafer, Aspects of 
Internalization (New York: International Universities Press, 1968); and Drew 
Westen, "The Superego: A Revised Developmental Model," Journal of the 
American Academy of Psychoanalysis 14 (1986): 181-202, 190ff. 
35At times, Freud seems to assume that the former internalization nec- 
essarily entails the latter, perhaps because a figure that is introjected, or 
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Both operations are necessary to produce a sense of moral au- 
thority, and hence a sense of guilt. An introjected parent might 
not carry the authority needed for inspiring guilt rather than brute 
fear if it were not an object of admiration, expressing standards 
that the ego applies to itself. The voice of conscience is partly in 
the ear of the beholder, so to speak: it's the voice of an inner critic 
as heard by an admiring ego. And what lends this voice the au- 
thority that's distinctive of morality is precisely the admiration with 
which it is heard. 
Freud's theory of moral authority thus requires an account of 
idealization, the process by which people, real and introjected, 
come to be admired as ideals. Freud offers two distinct accounts, 
both of which attribute idealization to the effects of love. 
Before I discuss the relation between idealization and love in 
taken in, becomes "a differentiating rade in the ego," whose demands 
upon the subject also qualify as his demands upon himself. But when a 
subject issues himself demands in the guise of an internalized other, he 
still receives those demands in propria persona, as represented by the undif- 
ferentiated remainder of his ego. And in this capacity as recipient, he-or, 
rather, his ego-may or may not accept the demands as applicable to him. 
He may instead take a dismissive or defiant attitude toward them, despite 
their issuing from a part of himself. His accepting them as applicable to 
him is what would constitute the second internalization-the "buying in," 
as I have called it. I believe that Freud is confused, or at least undecided, 
about the relation between taking in a demanding figure and buying in to 
his demands. As I have said, Freud sometimes seems to think that the 
former entails and hence explains the latter; but he also provides the latter 
with an independent explanation-as if the former doesn't explain it, after 
all. The independent explanation is that a child buys in to the demands 
represented by his parents insofar as he loves and admires them. I have 
made this explanation central to the view that I attribute to Freud because 
I believe that it is indeed necessary to account for the sense of guilt. But 
I acknowledge that Freud himself seems uncertain as to its necessity. 
I suggest that this uncertainty is what led Freud to vacillate on the ques- 
tion whether a child can experience guilt before having introjected his 
parents. (See note 26, above.) Taking in one's parents is not, in fact, nec- 
essary for guilt, since one can feel guilty in the face of one's actual parents, 
acknowledged as external authorities. But buying in to the demands of 
one's parents, or of other authority figures, is indeed necessary if fear of 
their punishment is to be transformed into moral anxiety, or guilt. Because 
Freud couldn't decide whether taking in parental authority entailed buying 
in to it, he vacillated on whether guilt without introjection was possible. 
Note, by the way, that Freud claimed introjection to be necessary for the 
opposite of guilt as well-that is, for the feeling of pride in one's self- 
restraint (Moses and Monotheism, S.E. 23:3-137, at 117). I suspect that the 
same confusion is at work in this passage as well. 
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detail, I should say that I am favorably inclined toward the theory 
that I have attributed to Freud thus far-up to the relation between 
idealization and love, but not including the details of that relation. 
Experience and introspection lead me to believe that we do indeed 
give ourselves moral direction and criticism in identification with 
other people whom we have loved, idealized, and imaginatively 
incorporated into ourselves. Like Scheffler and Deigh, I think that 
these leading elements of Freud's theory help us to understand 
the motivational force of moral authority; I would add that they 
also help us to understand the morally formative role of love. 
But Freud's overall outline of this role is separable from his spe- 
cific conception of love, and of how it leads to idealization. I shall 
argue that Freud's conception of love actually undermines his at- 
tempt to cast it as a morally formative emotion. 
Freud on Idealization 
Freud initially describes the ego's establishment of an ideal as in- 
dependent of-and, presumably, prior to-idealization of the par- 
ents. He says that the ego ideal is conjured up by the maturing 
subject as a means of recapturing the narcissism of infancy: 
As always where the libido is concerned, man has here again shown 
himself incapable of giving up a satisfaction he had once enjoyed. He 
is not willing to forgo the narcissistic perfection of his childhood; and 
when, as he grows up, he is disturbed by the admonitions of others 
and by the awakening of his own critical judgement, so that he can 
no longer retain that perfection, he seeks to recover it in the new 
form of an ego ideal. What he projects before him as his ideal is the 
substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his 
own ideal.36 
Here Freud may seem to have presupposed much of what he is 
trying to explain. He's trying to explain how the ego establishes 
standards of perfection for itself, in the form of an ego ideal. But 
his first step is to assume that the infantile ego already regards 
itself as perfect, and hence that it already possesses rudimentary 
standards of self-evaluation, however self-serving. At most, then, his 
story would seem to trace the evolution of these standards, not 
their inception. 
36"On Narcissism," S.E. 14:94. 
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Clearly, however, Freud thinks that he is also explaining the in- 
ception of self-evaluation, by explaining where the very idea of 
perfection comes from. He thinks that it comes from the experi- 
ence of primary narcissism, which is a primordial pooling of libido 
within the ego.37 During this period of development, the subject's 
ego, bathed in the positive energy of libido, is presented to him as 
a first instance of perfection-his first ideal, after which all subse- 
quent ideals are fashioned. 
Unfortunately, the details of this explanation reveal it to be fal- 
lacious. As we have seen, the subject is said to project the ego ideal 
because he is "incapable of giving up a satisfaction he had once 
enjoyed" or of "forgo[ing] the narcissistic perfection of his child- 
hood."38 He conjures up a new ideal "with the intention of re- 
establishing the self-satisfaction which was attached to primary in- 
fantile narcissism but which since then has suffered so many dis- 
turbances and mortifications."39 The problem is that these passages 
describe the idealizing effects of the narcissistic libido in equivocal 
terms. 
Since libido is an instinct, according to Freudian theory, it op- 
erates by means of an inner irritant that the subject is motivated 
to allay with the help of an object, from which he thereby attains 
a temporary satisfaction.40 The subject of primary narcissism can 
be described as self-satisfied, then, because he finds relief from 
instinctual tension within himself, without the need for an external 
object. And libido theory would indeed predict his unwillingness 
to give up such an immediate fulfillment of his needs-which 
might be described either as "a satisfaction he had once enjoyed" 
or as "the narcissistic perfection of his childhood." 
But Freud then takes these phrases to denote a flattering self- 
image, such as would initially make the child "his own ideal" and 
would subsequently be undermined by "critical judgement." Freud 
thereby implies that the child initially satisfies himself, not only in 
the sense of fulfilling his own needs, but also in the sense of meet- 
ing with his own approval. The young narcissist is portrayed, not 
37"Three Essays," S.E. 7:218; "On Narcissism," S.E. 14:75-76; Introduc- 
tory Lectures, S.E. 15-16, at 16:416 [517-18]. 
38"On Narcissism," quoted above, at note 36. 
39Introductory Lectures, S.E. 16:429 [533]. Freud also describes the nar- 
cissism of children as "self-contentment" ("On Narcissism," S.E. 14:89). 
40 "Instincts and their Vicissitudes," S.E. 14:111-40, at 118-23. 
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just as perfectly satisfied, but as satisfied that he's perfect. He isn't 
just inwardly sated; he's smug. 
The term 'satisfaction' has now been used in two different sens- 
es. In libido theory proper, the term denotes the experienced ful- 
fillment of instinctual need; when the theory is applied to primary 
narcissism, however, the term denotes a favorable value judg- 
ment.41 By eliding the gap between these senses, Freud gives libido 
theory the semblance of explaining why a child would begin life 
with a favorable self-assessment, whose loss to external criticism 
would then oblige him to project an ego ideal. In fact, libido the- 
ory has no resources to explain why the child would initially ap- 
prove of himself, much less why he would want to continue ap- 
proving of himself or receiving his own approval.42 
41For a particularly clear instance of this equivocation, see Group Psy- 
chology, 18:110 [52-53]: "We have said that [the ego ideal] is the heir to 
the original narcissism in which the childish ego enjoyed self-sufficiency 
[sich selbst genfigte]; it gradually gathers up from the influences of the 
environment the demands which that environment makes upon the ego 
and which the ego cannot always rise to; so that a man, when he cannot 
be satisfied with his ego itself [mit seinem Ich selbst nicht zufrieden sein 
kann], may nevertheless be able to find satisfaction [Befriedigung] in the 
ego ideal which has been differentiated out of the ego." 
42Freud sometimes attempts to provide an explanatory connection be- 
tween libido and value judgment, but without success. In one passage, he 
explains that libidinal objects are idealized so that they can replace "some 
unattained ego ideal ... as a means of satisfying our narcissism" (Group 
Psychology, S.E. 18:112-13 [56]). Of course, this explanation implicitly as- 
sumes the idealizing effect of libido in the case of narcissism, which is just 
another instance of what needs to be explained. Freud's other attempts at 
explanation are no more successful. For example: "It is only in the rarest 
instances that the psychical valuation that is set on the sexual object, as 
being the goal of the sexual instinct, stops short at its genitals. The appre- 
ciation extends to the whole body of the sexual object and tends to involve 
every sensation derived from it. The same over-valuation spreads over into 
the psychological sphere: the subject becomes, as it were, intellectually 
infatuated (that is, his powers of judgement are weakened) by the mental 
achievements and perfections of the sexual object and he submits to the 
latter's judgements with credulity. Thus, the credulity of love becomes an 
important, if not the most fundamental, source of authority" ("Three Es- 
says," S.E. 7:150). At the beginning of this passage, Freud equates taking 
an object as "the goal of the sexual instinct" with setting a "valuation" on 
it, or having an "appreciation" for it. But the goal of the sexual instinct, 
according to libido theory, is either relief from sexual tension or an object 
sought as a source of that relief. And how does an object's being sought 
for sexual purposes amount to its being valued or appreciated? Freud then 
says that the subject expands his valuation of the object because of being 
"infatuated," in the sense that "his powers of judgment are weakened." 
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Freud's early account of the ego ideal therefore lacks the very 
element that's needed to complete his explanation of moral au- 
thority. What's needed is an explanation of how the ego comes to 
elevate someone or something to the status of an ideal, which can 
become the object of moral anxiety. In his first attempt at this 
explanation, however, Freud offers only an equivocation instead. 
Freud later attributes the ego ideal to introjection of the parents 
as objects of admiration.43 The ego ideal is now thought to preserve 
the idealized parents rather than replace the idealized self. As be- 
fore, however, the question is how the prior idealization comes 
about-in this case, the idealization of the parents. 
The answer in this case is that the parents are idealized through 
the mechanism of primary identification: 
A little boy will exhibit a special interest in his father; he would like 
to grow like him and be like him, and take his place everywhere. We 
may say simply that he takes his father as his ideal.44 
This primary identification antedates the boy's introjection of his 
father into his superego; indeed, it antedates the Oedipus com- 
plex, which will be resolved by that later, more consequential iden- 
tification.45 
In primary identification, the child idealizes his parents in the 
sense that he wants to be like them, and he wants to be like his 
parents because he wants to ingest them. The child is in his oral 
phase, when "sexual activity has not yet been separated from the 
ingestion of food" and so "the sexual aim consists in the incor- 
This explanation would make no sense if the latter phrase meant that the 
subject loses his capacity to make evaluative judgments: the phrase must 
mean that the subject becomes less demanding or critical in his evalua- 
tions. The explanation therefore presupposes the existence of an evaluative 
faculty whose standards can be corrupted by the libido. And this evaluative 
faculty must then be the "fundamental source of authority," since it pro- 
vides the capacity of judging another person to have "achievements" and 
"perfections" that justify deferring to him. The libido appears to be re- 
sponsible only for the misapplication of these judgments-and hence the 
misattribution of authority-to undeserving objects. 
43For example, New Introductory Lectures, S.E. 22:65 [81]: "There is no 
doubt that this ego ideal is the precipitate of the old picture of the parents, 
the expression of admiration for the perfection which the child then at- 
tributed to them." See also note 28, above. 
44 Group Psychology S.E. 18:105 [46]. 
45The Ego and the Id, S.E. 19:31ff. [26ff.]; Group Psychology, chap. 7; New 
Introductory Lectures, S.E. 22:64 [80]. 
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poration of the object."46 The child's love therefore takes the form 
of a desire for "the oral, cannibalistic incorporation of the other 
person. '47 And because of an imaginative association between in- 
corporating and embodying, as it were, the desire to incorporate 
the other turns into a desire to be the other, or at least to resemble 
him.48 
Now, idealizing someone does entail wanting to be like him, or 
even wishing that one were he; and this entailment lends some 
plausibility to Freud's account of identification. Strictly speaking, 
however, the account requires an entailment in the other direction, 
since it seeks to explain idealization of the father in terms of the 
desire to resemble or be him. This explanation will work only if 
wanting to resemble or be another person is sufficient for ideal- 
izing him. 
We can imagine why this latter entailment might be thought to 
hold. Assume, for the sake of argument, that whatever is desired, 
is desired sub specie boni, as good.49 This assumption implies that if 
a child wants to be like his father, then he regards being like him 
as good. And placing value on resembling someone comes very 
close to idealizing him. 
But not close enough. In order to idealize a person, one must 
not just regard being like him as a valuable way to be; one must 
regard it as a way of being valuable. The idealizing thought is not 
just "It would be better if I resembled him" but "Iwould be better 
if I resembled him." Insofar as one places value on the state of 
resembling the other person, one must do so because of value 
placed on that person, or on the person one would be in that state. 
Suppose that resembling another person appeals to you merely 
as fun. In that case, you value the resemblance without necessarily 
valuing who it would make you; and so a lack of resemblance would 
46 Three Essays, S.E. 7:198. 
47New Introductory Lectures, S.E. 22:63 [79]. 
48If we say that the child's desire to be like his parents is, at bottom, a 
desire to incorporate them, then shouldn't we say that his desire to be like 
his ego ideal is, at bottom, a desire to incorporate it? Hasn't he already 
incorporated it? The answer, I suppose, is that in establishing his ego ideal, 
the child has incorporated his parents only incompletely, so that the in- 
corporative desire persists. See the discussion in Group Psychology, chap. 11, 
of the ego's ongoing desire to "coincide" with the ego ideal. 
49I believe that this assumption is false. See my paper "The Guise of 
the Good," Nofts 26 (1992): 3-26. 
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make you feel frustrated without making you feel diminished- 
disappointed with the outcome but not disappointed in yourself. 
The same goes for the boy who wants to embody his father. The 
boy has this desire only because he doesn't yet distinguish between 
loving a person and hungering for a meal. Loving his father, he 
hungers for him.50 The resulting desire to incorporate his father 
should hardly lead him to like or dislike himself according to 
whether he succeeds. The desire to fill his belly isn't an aspiration 
to be a full-bellied person. Similarly, the desire to incorporate fa- 
ther, if formed on the model of hunger, wouldn't constitute an 
aspiration to be father-ful.5' 
More significantly, wanting to incorporate one's father would not 
entail conceding his authority to punish one's failure to incorpo- 
rate him. Idealization brings a sense of exposure to punishment 
only because it places a value on the ideal, as worthy of governing 
one's life. As I put it before: when someone has been placed on a 
pedestal, his aggression can be feared as coming from above, as 
aggression before which to bow as well as cower. But he cannot 
inspire such moral anxiety by virtue of being placed on a serving 
dish instead. His aggression, in that case, is more likely to be per- 
ceived as a defense against being consumed than as punishment 
for one's failure to consume him. 
Materials for an Alternative Account 
I have now argued that Freud encounters two dead-ends in at- 
tempting to explain the authority of the superego. He attributes 
this authority to the love that was felt in infancy for one or another 
precursor of the superego-either narcissistic love for the self or 
identificatory love for a parent. In neither case can Freud explain 
how love endows its object with the sort of authority that, when 
50Freud contrasts object love with identification by saying that the for- 
mer is a desire to have while the latter is a desire to be (Group Psychology, 
S.E. 18:106 [47]). But the desire to be, when traced to its origins in the 
oral phase, turns out to consist in a desire to incorporate. A more accurate 
contrast would be that between a desire to have and a desire to have for 
dinner For an interesting discussion of this contrast, see Mikkel Borch- 
Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject, trans. Catherine Porter (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1988), 28ff. 
51Similar points are made by Schafer, Aspects of Internalization, 18-22. 
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inherited by the superego, would make it an object of moral anx- 
iety. 
I think that Freud makes various gestures toward a third and 
more successful account of idealization. These gestures point to a 
capacity in the ego to conduct evaluative reasoning about ideals 
that it has adopted or might adopt. Freud never follows up these 
gestures: the rational capacities of the ego seem not to engage his 
interest. Pursuing this third account of idealization therefore en- 
tails a fair amount of extrapolation from the Freudian texts. 
I want to attempt this extrapolation because I believe that it re- 
veals, first, why the superego as Freud conceived it cannot play the 
role of moral authority; but, second, how Freud's conception of 
the superego can be revised so as to play that role. We can locate 
moral authority in figures who were loved and consequently inter- 
nalized, I shall argue, provided that we expand on Freud's under- 
standing of what gets internalized from the objects of love. 
The third, implicit account of idealization is that it is the work 
of an independent faculty of normative judgment, located in the 
ego. This faculty is hinted at in both stories that Freud tells about 
the development of the ego ideal. 
In Freud's first story, the ego ideal is created to receive the ap- 
proval that the ego can no longer bestow on itself. The ideal is 
therefore fashioned out of those virtues which the ego has found 
itself to lack. It "gathers up from the influences of the environment 
the demands which that environment makes upon the ego and 
which the ego cannot always rise to."52 The child's failure to meet 
these demands is reflected back to him in the "admonitions" that 
render his primary narcissism untenable.53 And the ego now en- 
visions its ideal as meeting those particular demands, and hence 
as an improvement upon its discredited self. 
Yet the child must fail to meet a vast miscellany of demands, 
whose collective embodiment would yield a motley and rather ba- 
nal ideal. The ego ideal that survives into adulthood cannot simply 
be the agglomeration of whichever demands the ego has not man- 
aged to satisfy in childhood. Of the demands that my father made 
52 Group Psychology, S.E. 18:100 [52]. See also p. 131 [81]: "The ego ideal 
comprises the sum of all the limitations in which the ego has had to ac- 
quiesce." 
53"On Narcissim," S.E. 14:94 (quoted above, at note 36). 
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on me as a child, the ones to which I was most notoriously unequal 
were to switch off the lights when I left a room, to wash my hands 
before coming to the table, and to lower my piercing voice. But I 
have never harbored an idealized image of myself as a well-mani- 
cured baritone conservationist. 
Even if the raw materials of the ego ideal are derived from de- 
mands made on a child by others, he must somehow select among 
them, rank them, and organize them into a coherent image of a 
better self. He must figure out how to extrapolate from the finite 
corpus of past demands to the indefinite series of novel situations 
that he will encounter in the future. Here is one point at which 
he must engage in evaluative reasoning.54 Freud himself appears 
to acknowledge the child's use of such reasoning, for example, 
when he refers to "the awakening of his own critical judgement."55 
This acknowledgment becomes clearer when Freud subsequently 
attributes the ideal to introjection of the admired parents. In tell- 
ing this version of the story, Freud often points out that the child 
gradually transfers his admiration from his parents to other figures, 
who are often of his own choosing. 
Freud describes this shift of allegiance as occurring in two phas- 
es. Initially, adults outside the family come to share the parental 
role, including that of shaping the superego: 
This parental influence of course includes in its operation not only 
the personalities of the actual parents but also the family, racial and 
national traditions handed on through them, as well as the demands 
of the immediate social milieu which they represent. In the same way, 
the super-ego, in the course of an individual's development, receives 
540ne might argue that the parents select and organize their demands 
for the child, by offering general principles of conduct. This suggestion 
would be in keeping with a famous remark of Freud's: " [A] child's super- 
ego is in fact constructed on the model not of its parents but of its parents' 
super-ego; the contents which fill it are the same and it becomes the vehicle 
of tradition and of all the time-resisting judgements of value which have 
propagated themselves in this manner from generation to generation" 
(New Introductory Lectures, S.E. 22:67 [84]). Yet this remark suggests a mech- 
anism for propagating principles of conduct, not a mechanism for for- 
mulating them in the first place. If the child's ancestors were, like him, 
passive receptacles of demands made upon them, then they would no more 
have organized and generalized their ideals than he. 
55"On Narcissism," quoted at note 36, above. 
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contributions from later successors and substitutes of his parents, such 
as teachers and models in public life of admired social ideals.56 
Subsequently the child becomes disillusioned with parental figures 
altogether and replaces them with other adults as objects of his 
admiration. But these replacements are not introjected: 
The course of childhood development leads to an ever-increasing de- 
tachment from parents, and their personal significance for the super- 
ego recedes into the background. To the images they leave behind 
there are then linked the influences of teachers and authorities, self- 
chosen models and publicly recognized heroes, whose figures need no 
longer be introjected by an ego which has become more resistant.57 
When these two phases are conjoined, the process looks like this: 
In the course of development the super-ego also takes on the influ- 
ences of those who have stepped into the place of parents-educators, 
teachers, people chosen as ideal models. Normally it departs more and 
more from the original parental figures; it becomes, so to say, more 
impersonal. Nor must it be forgotten that a child has a different es- 
timate of its parents at different periods of its life. At the time at which 
the Oedipus complex gives place to the super-ego they are something 
quite magnificent; but later they lose much of this. Identifications then 
come about with these later parents as well, and indeed they regularly 
make important contributions to the formation of character; but in 
that case they only affect the ego, they no longer influence the super- 
ego, which has been determined by the earliest parental imagos.58 
First the personal stamp of the actual parents is eroded from the 
superego by the imprints of other parental figures. Then the su- 
perego becomes fixed, and subsequent ideals make their impres- 
sion upon the ego instead. 
These descriptions indirectly credit the child with evaluative 
judgment in his attachment to adults other than his parents. Al- 
though the new objects of attachment usually occupy socially de- 
fined positions of authority, they do not include everyone occu- 
pying such positions. Not every caretaker, teacher, or cultural hero 
wins the child's admiration. In the passages just quoted, Freud 
twice describes the child as exercising a choice among the models 
56 outline of Psychoanalysis, S.E. 23:146 [16]. See also The Ego and the Id, 
S.E. 19:37 [33]; Group Psychology, S.E. 18:129 [78]. 
57"The Economic Problem of Masochism," S.E. 19:168. 
58New Introductory Lectures, S.E. 22:64 [80]. 
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available to him, and this capacity for choice would seem to require 
a capacity for evaluative reasoning. 
Evaluative judgment plays an even clearer role in the child's de- 
tachment from his parents. Although this detachment is motivated 
in part by emotional conflict within the family, it is also guided by 
the child's growing appreciation for real differences in value: 
For a small child his parents are at first the only authority and the 
source of all belief. The child's most intense and most momentous 
wish during these early years is to be like his parents (that is, the 
parent of his own sex) and to be big like his father and mother. But 
as intellectual growth increases, the child cannot help discovering by 
degrees the category to which his parents belong. He gets to know 
other parents and compares them with his own, and so acquires the 
right to doubt the incomparable and unique quality which he had 
attributed to them. Small events in the child's life which make him 
feel dissatisfied afford him provocation for beginning to criticize his 
parents, and for using, in order to support his critical attitude, the 
knowledge which he has acquired that other parents are in some re- 
spects preferable to them.59 
Later the child will long for "the happy, vanished days when his 
father seemed to him the noblest and strongest of men and his 
mother the dearest and loveliest of women.' '60 
Freud doesn't explain how the child acquires the knowledge that 
other parents are in some respects preferable to his own. If the 
child's standards of what is noble or lovely are in fact images of 
his own father and mother, then he won't discover anyone who 
meets those standards better than father and mother themselves. 
How, then, does he discover that other adults are nobler or lovelier 
than the figures who epitomize these qualities for him? 
The answer must be that the "intellectual growth" and "critical 
attitude" to which Freud alludes somehow enable the child to ap- 
ply evaluative concepts autonomously, even to the extent of re- 
evaluating the instances from which he first learned them. This 
answer implies that the child possesses an evaluative faculty that is 
independent of the received values preserved in his superego. 
This faculty is probably one and the same as that which Freud 
repeatedly cites as instrumental to the therapeutic efficacy of psy- 
choanalysis. The benefit of revealing previously repressed impulses 
59"Family Romances," S.E. 9:236-41, at 237. 
60Ibid., 241. 
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in psychoanalysis, Freud explains, is that they can then be submit- 
ted to "acts of judgment," by which they will be accepted or re- 
jected rather than merely repressed.6' In such acts of judgment 
"the compass of the ego [is] extended,"62 and repression is thereby 
replaced by "the highest of the human mental functions."63 
What now begins to emerge is that the superego is not a final 
or ultimate authority in the Freudian psyche. The superego wields 
authority only in the eyes of an admiring ego, and the ego pos- 
sesses an independent faculty of judgment as to whom or what to 
admire. This evaluative faculty lends authority to the superego but 
can also call that authority into doubt. 
The Locus of Authority 
The secondary position of the superego in the order of normative 
authority raises a question about Freud's account of morality. If 
Freud doesn't think that the superego holds ultimate authority for 
the subject, why does he make it the seat of conscience? 
The answer, I suspect, is that Freud doesn't think of conscience 
or morality as holding ultimate authority, either. For Freud, "mo- 
rality" means so-called morality-what society defines as morality- 
not the abstract, true morality of moral philosophers. By the same 
token, "conscience" means the psychic agent of so-called morality, 
the inner representative of a social force, rather than a faculty of 
moral perception or reasoning. Freud is deeply ambivalent about 
the social force called morality, and he consequently places its in- 
ner representative under the ultimate authority of the ego, whose 
evaluative capacities he would never have accused of being "mor- 
al." 
To those who do not share Freud's moral skepticism, the super- 
ego's lack of ultimate normative authority is a reason for denying 
that it plays the role of moral authority. That role may appear to 
6'Autobiographical Study, S.E. 20:30 [32]. See "Five Lectures on Psycho- 
Analysis," S.E. 11:3-55, at 28, 53; "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old 
Boy," S.E. 10:3-149, at 145; "Repression," S.E. 14:143-58, at 146; Outline 
of Psycho-Analysis, S.E. 23:179 [58]. See also Introductory Lectures, S.E 16:294 
[364]; "A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis," S.E. 21:238-48, at 
309-10. 
62 Outline of Psycho-Analysis, S.E. 23:179 [58]. 
63'"Five Lectures," 11:28. See also "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year- 
Old Boy," S.E. 10:145. 
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have fallen instead to the ego, which has the final say. Moral phi- 
losophers may therefore be tempted, if not to discard Freudian 
theory, then at least to revise it by relocating the seat of con- 
science.64 But I favor an alternative approach. What Freud's ac- 
count of the conscience needs, I think, is not so much revision as 
supplementation, at precisely that point where Freud loses inter- 
est-namely, the ego's capacity for evaluative judgment. 
Freud describes the ego as the seat of "reason and good 
sense."65 But how can the ego exercise reason and good sense if 
there are no standards of rationality to which it aspires? The ratio- 
nal function that Freud has assigned to the ego would seem to 
require that it have a more extensive ideal than he has provided. 
The only ideal that Freud has provided for the ego embodies 
minor and essentially contestable virtues. It is modeled upon con- 
tingent features of people whose contingent relations to the subject 
placed them in the way of his instincts early in life. The standards 
set by this ideal are simply the standards that happened to be set 
by the first people he happened to love. Indeed, they are standards 
set by the halo in which such people appeared to the child through 
the haze of his libido. 
The Freudian superego lacks ultimate authority, then, because 
it reflects the child's infatuation with his parents, which is super- 
seded in maturity by evaluative reasoning undertaken by the ego 
under norms of rationality. But how does a child acquire the latter 
norms? How does he learn to exercise reason and good sense, if 
not by observing and emulating the example of his parents? 
To be sure, a child's love for his parents causes him to glamorize 
them, and the glamour is bound to fade. But the child's love is 
also, and fundamentally, his response to a value that the parents 
genuinely possess. 
Out of their love for the child, the parents care for him with a 
wise good will, to which he responds with love. What the child 
experiences in being loved by his parents, and what he responds 
to in loving them, is their capacity to anticipate and provide for 
his needs, often at the expense of their own interests. And this 
capacity of the parents is nothing other than their practical reason, 
64This appears to be the revision favored by Deigh (see the material at 
note 4, above). 
65New Introductory Lectures, S.E. 22:76 [95]. 
556 
A RATIONAL SUPEREGO 
or practical good sense, by which their immediate self-gratification 
is subordinated to rational requirements embodied in another per- 
son. It's their capacity to take another person as an end. Hence 
the child's love for his parents doesn't merely project a superficial 
glow onto them; it registers the genuine value of their reason and 
good sense-what Kant would call their rational nature, or hu- 
manity-as manifested in their loving care. 
Although the child may overvalue his parents as the noblest and 
loveliest specimens of humanity, he does not err in loving them, 
to begin with, as specimens of humanity, in the Kantian sense of 
the word. And when he later internalizes their tin nobility and 
paper loveliness, he must also internalize their humanity, which is 
pure gold-a standard not to be superseded by other ideals. 
Thus, the parents' loving care of the child demonstrates their 
capacity to take him as an end in himself, and this capacity provides 
an object for his love, to begin with, and later an object for his 
reverence, as an ideal to be emulated. When he internalizes this 
ideal, in the image of his loving parents, he internalizes the Cate- 
gorical Imperative, which just is a description of the capacity to 
take persons as ends. 
This ideal carries genuine moral authority, which underwrites 
the issuance and enforcement of more specific demands. In issuing 
and enforcing these demands, parents do not merely spell out for 
the child what is required of him by the ideal of taking persons as 
ends; they also instantiate the ideal itself, by treating him as a re- 
sponsible person who can be held to rational requirements.66 
Insofar as the child sees parental discipline as expounding re- 
spect for persons and as expressing respect for him, his fear of that 
discipline will be tempered by respect or reverence for its moral 
authority, thus being transformed into genuinely moral anxiety. Of 
course, respect for parental discipline as embodying the Categor- 
ical Imperative is a sophisticated attainment, which cannot be ex- 
pected of a younger child. But a younger child can still idealize his 
parents in other ways and hence feel an approximation of what he 
will feel later, when he can look to them as instances of the moral 
ideal. 
For this reason, I do not want to reject Freud's notion that the 
66Here I have benefited from Tamar Schapiro's paper "What is a 
Child," Ethics 109 (1999): 715-38. 
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child's fear of his parents is initially transformed into guilt by his 
admiration for their nobility and loveliness, or even for their phys- 
ical size and strength. This admiration, too, depends on the ego's 
capacity for evaluation rather than on the effects of libidinal drives; 
but it is an immature admiration, yielding an immature sense of 
the parents' authority. The initial account of parental authority that 
I attributed to Freud, and the present account that I have imposed 
upon him by way of revision, should thus be taken as describing 
different stages of development, the one serving as an early pro- 
totype of the other. 
So perhaps the superego really can be the Categorical Impera- 
tive. All that would be required for a true marriage of Freudian 
and Kantian moral theory is this: on Freud's side, that the ideals 
incorporated into the superego include an ideal of practical rea- 
son; and on Kant's side, that the Categorical Imperative-which is 
an ideal of practical reason-take the form of an ego ideal. 
I have argued elsewhere that Kant's contribution to this marriage 
is available in his own words.67 I have not argued here that the 
same can be said of Freud. What I have argued instead is that 
Freudian theory has a place for his contribution-a blank space, 
where Freud neglected to provide the ego with norms to govern 
its practical reasoning. I have also suggested that a self-ideal to fill 
this space could indeed be acquired in the manner posited by 
Freud, through the internalization of that which a child values in 
his parents by reciprocating their love.68 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 
67See my "Voice of Conscience." 
68This suggestion depends on arguments that I give in "Love as a Moral 
Emotion." 
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